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A B S T R A C T   
Given current land degradation trends, Land Degradation Neutrality (LDN, SDG Target 15.3) by 2030 could be 
difficult to attain. Solutions to avoid, reduce, and reverse land degradation are not being implemented at suf-
ficiently large scales, pointing to land governance as the main obstacle. In this paper, we review dynamics in 
agricultural land governance, and the potential this may have to enable land degradation or provide solutions 
towards LDN. The literature reveals agency shifts are taking place, where value chain actors are given increasing 
decision-making power in land governance. These agency shifts are manifested in two interrelated trends: First, 
through agricultural value chain coordination, such as contract farming, value chain actors increasingly influ-
ence land management decisions. Second, international large-scale land acquisitions and domestic larger-scale 
farms, both instances of intensified direct involvement of value chain with land management, are overtaking 
significant areas of land. These new arrangements are associated with agricultural expansion, and are addi-
tionally associated with unsustainable land management due to absent landowners, short-term interests, and 
high-intensity agriculture. However, we also find that value chain actors have both the tools and business cases 
to catalyze LDN solutions. We discuss how governments and other LDN brokers can motivate or push private 
actors to deploy private governance measures to avoid, reduce, and reverse land degradation. Successful 
implementation of LDN requires refocusing efforts to enable and, where necessary, constrain all actors with 
agency over land management, including value chain actors.   
1. Introduction 
Land degradation, defined broadly as a reduction of biological pro-
ductivity and a decrease in ecosystem complexity, has affected over 20% 
of the global vegetated land area and 1.5 billion people in the last two 
decades (UNCCD, 2017). On agricultural land, land degradation is 
mostly anthropogenic, due to unsustainable agricultural practices and 
ill-adapted land and water management. Underlying drivers include 
both socio-economic and political factors (Vorovencii, 2016). On a 
global scale, degradation of agricultural landscapes undermines food 
security, reduces carbon storage in soils and biomass, and causes major 
economic losses, especially in already poor areas (Muchena et al., 2005; 
UNDP/UNCCD, 2011). 
A structural answer to the land degradation issue has been proposed 
by the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) 
through the concept of Land Degradation Neutrality (LDN). LDN has 
been adopted as a target under the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) as target 15.3. A range of LDN brokers, actors aiming to drive 
progress towards the attainment of LDN, help countries to set targets and 
their implementation, including international NGOs, knowledge in-
stitutes, and funding mechanisms. Conceptually, LDN sets out the 
ambition to, on balance, maintain or increase the amount and quality of 
land resources by compensating any land degradation with land resto-
ration, within specified time- and spatial-scales (Cowie et al., 2018). 
Technical implementation of LDN interventions occurs at a national 
scale, by compensating any ongoing land degradation within a land type 
by restoration and rehabilitation of the same amount of land of this type 
elsewhere. To this end, National Action Programmes are developed to 
envision pathways towards LDN, and concrete actions are outlined in 
Target Setting Programmes (Global Mechanism, 2019a). 
LDN on agricultural land is feasible from a technical standpoint, as 
sustainable land management (SLM) and restoration techniques are 
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readily available to counteract a wide range of land degradation issues. 
Yet, the bottleneck is the adoption of these techniques (Pacheco et al., 
2018; Thomas et al., 2018). Land management decisions are made and 
influenced by a diverse set of actors, including for example smallholders, 
agribusinesses, agricultural cooperatives, and local to national land 
administrations. All of these need to be enabled and incentivized to 
avoid, reduce and reverse land degradation. Policy makers therefore 
face the challenge to create an enabling environment, i.e. a context that 
allows progress towards LDN (Akhtar-Schuster et al., 2017). This chal-
lenge is essentially an exercise of land governance (i.e. the processes by 
which decisions are made regarding the access to and use of land, the manner 
in which those decisions are implemented and the way that conflicting in-
terests in land are reconciled (Borras and Franco, 2010; GLTN, 2018)). 
Land governance encompasses elements of land use policy (the laws and 
regulations around land use and management) and land tenure (the 
bundle of rights endowed on various users and user groups). Consis-
tently, a lack of effective and responsible land governance has been cited 
as a major constraint for large-scale adoption of SLM and restoration/ 
rehabilitation projects (Nkonya et al., 2016; Verburg et al., 2019). 
Traditional land governance assessments assume that agency over 
agricultural land management (i.e. the capacity to make decisions on 
land use and management) lies primarily with local or national actors, 
such as farmers or public land administrations (Sikor et al., 2013). 
However, land governance can be influenced by a much broader range 
of actors, including for example agribusinesses, retailers and other value 
chain actors (VCAs) (Lambin and Thorlakson, 2018), as well as con-
sumers. As land systems globalize, agency over rural land management 
decisions has expanded to include urban elites and non-local actors 
along commodity value chains (Peluso and Lund, 2011). 
Recent literature points to major dynamics in land tenure and agency 
over land management decisions in the agricultural sector over the past 
two decades. Noteworthy are recent developments in large scale land 
acquisitions (LSLA), where (often foreign) investors acquire large tracts 
of land (Nolte et al., 2016), medium-scale farms in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Jayne et al., 2016), land concentration in South America (Gómez, 
2014), and contract farming (Otsuka et al., 2016). These trends point to 
a drastic diversification of actors relevant in contemporary land 
governance. 
While the wider range of possible actors in land governance and 
environmental management is increasingly being recognized (Peluso 
and Lund, 2011), knowledge on their characteristics and geography is 
limited and scattered across disciplines. Furthermore, understanding of 
the implications for global environmental change issues, both in terms of 
threats and innovative solutions, has emerged only recently. Yet, new 
actors and value chain coordination are found to be associated with both 
severe land degradation (e.g. Liao et al., 2020), and with innovative 
solutions for environmental stewardship (e.g. Rueda et al., 2017). 
Because the heterogeneity of contexts of land degradation makes scal-
able LDN governance solutions highly needed (Ariti et al., 2019; Seppelt 
et al., 2018; Sparrow et al., 2020), it is pertinent to identify new ways to 
make progress towards LDN with a full consideration of the threats and 
opportunities that new actors present. 
Most current efforts to combat land degradation and create an 
enabling environment for LDN are poorly reconciled with the changing 
land governance context. Geared towards state actors and local land 
managers, they remain somewhat inattentive to the role VCAs could 
play. For example, the National Action Programmes made by UNCCD’s 
parties contain plans for governmental agencies, scientific institutions, 
and local communities (UNCCD, 2020), and rarely consider the role of 
VCAs as drivers of or solutions to land degradation. 
The objective of this paper is to quantify and map recent dynamics in 
agricultural land governance and assess the implications of these dy-
namics for the attainment of the LDN target, both in terms of new drivers 
of land degradation and innovative governance solutions towards LDN. 
We review evidence from recent peer-reviewed and grey literature on 
agency shifts in land governance and their consequences for enabling 
land degradation or leveraging LDN. The study focuses specifically on 
agricultural land and agricultural value chains. Three steps are taken 
towards this goal: (1) to quantify and, where possible, map current 
dynamics of land control and value chain coordination, and link these 
hitherto disparate dynamics within a framework of agency in land 
governance, (2) to describe the mechanisms by which land control dy-
namics and value chain coordination is associated with land degrada-
tion, and (3) to present ways for LDN brokers and actors along 
agricultural value chains to reposition themselves in this changing re-
ality, so as to unlock novel, catalytic governance solutions for the 
attainment of land degradation neutrality. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Analytical framework and definitions 
LDN requires major transitions in land use and land management, 
raising the question on who decides on these issues. This paper adopts 
the perspective of agency to formulate answers to this question. Agency 
is defined as the capacity of an actor to instigate changes in land use and 
land management. This agency is usually not wielded by a single person 
or institution, but rather distributed across multiple actors. As the focus 
is primarily on the agricultural sector, other land-based activities 
(mining, forestry, etc.) that are relevant for LDN are not considered. 
Conceptually, we distinguish three actor groups in land governance: 
individual land managers, state actors, and VCAs. First, we consider land 
managers, defined as people with rights to control land (Table 1). 
Control rights are an element of land tenure next to use and transfer 
rights (FAO, 2002). We use the term land manager to denote people who 
are entitled to change land use and management (setting them apart 
from land users, who do not enjoy such rights). Land managers can be 
land owners if they also enjoy land transfer rights, but in many situations, 
the land owner and land manager of a specific parcel are not the same. 
A second actor group are state actors, defined as governmental in-
stitutions at any administrative level that decide on land-related issues. 
This is in itself a heterogeneous group, consisting of, among others, 
municipalities, agricultural and environmental ministries, and land-
scape planners. 
VCAs (i.e. actors up- and downstream of the farm in agricultural 
value chains) compose the third group. These actors include, among 
others, agribusinesses, retailers, processors, and land investors, and in-
fluence land management by setting production requirements, 
providing agricultural technologies, and in some cases claiming full land 
control and/or land transfer rights. 
The relative agency of these actor groups in a given land system can 
be visualized in an agency diagram (Fig. 1). This diagram shows how 
agency is shared among the three groups, with each corner representing 
full agency of a single actor group. For example, the top corner repre-
sents a land system where state actors hold all authority over land- 
related issues, a situation that may be found in strictly protected natu-
ral reserves. In the bottom right corner, a land system of pure land 
Table 1 
Distinction between land user, land manager, and land owner in terms of their 
respective land tenure rights. Definitions are based on FAO (2002). In these 
definitions, rights may be formal, customary or assumed.  
Has right to… Right to use 
use land 
Right to control 
use land 
change land use 
manage land 
grant use rights 
Right to transfer 
use land 
change land use 
manage land 
grant use rights 
grant control rights 
sell/transfer land to others 
Land user Yes Optional Optional 
Land manager Yes Yes Optional 
Land owner Yes Yes Yes  
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manager agency is depicted, which is perhaps most closely approxi-
mated by subsistence-focused communities in remote places where state 
actors have no effective power. The bottom left corner represents a 
context where land decisions are made only by VCAs, a situation that is 
approximated by certain instances of plantations in countries with weak 
land governance institutions. In reality, however, agency is usually 
shared by at least two actors, and is therefore situated more centrally in 
the diagram. For example, most smallholder farmers act with relative 
autonomy but are subjected to the land laws set out by state actors in-
sofar as these are effectively enforced, and will respond to land man-
agement requirements set by VCAs insofar as following these 
requirements is beneficial to them. 
2.2. Synthesis of agency shifts and their implications for LDN 
We combine quantitative and qualitative approaches to synthesize 
the extent and geography of agency shifts in land governance and their 
implications for LDN, in three steps. 
First, we quantified and mapped agricultural land governance dy-
namics. Value chain coordination was approximated by the scientific 
literature describing contract farming arrangements. Recent literature 
(2007 and onwards) on contract farming was collected using Keywords 
“Contract farming” and “Contract Farm” in Web of Science. Papers were 
screened on relevance, retaining only those describing pre-harvest 
agreements between farmers and buyers. A cartography of retained 
papers was prepared by pinpointing the location of the case(s) 
described, and a timeline of publications was made. A distinction be-
tween local, regional and national case studies was made, with local case 
studies describing a relatively small area (e.g. a village), regional case 
studies describing a larger subnational area (e.g. a province) and na-
tional studies characterizing a country. Where a single paper described 
multiple cases, these were mapped separately. 
International LSLAs were mapped and quantified using data avail-
able in the crowdsourced Land Matrix (Land Matrix, 2019) database. We 
used this database to map transnational land acquisitions for which 
contract negotiations have been concluded. Domestic Larger-Scale 
Farms (DLSFs) are not mapped, as this highly heterogeneous process is 
not easily captured under a single, quantifiable denominator. Instead, 
we discuss the various shapes DLSFs take in different parts of the world, 
and provide statistics where these are available. 
Second, to describe the mechanisms by which agency shifts can lead 
to land degradation, we synthesized the current state of knowledge on 
the environmental impacts of value chain coordination, LSLAs, and 
DLSFs. We searched academic search engines and repositories, including 
Google Scholar and Web of Science, using keywords including “large- 
scale land acquisition”, “land grab(bing)”, “land tenure”, “agricultural 
commercialization”, and more, and identified papers or grey literature 
that address environmental impacts of LSLAs, DLSFs, and the many in-
stances of value chain coordination. Retained documents were used for 
forward and backward snowballing to retrieve additional entries. From 
the collected literature, we retrieved and coded evidence for causal in-
ferences (where land degradation is merely found to be associated with 
the process) and mechanisms (where the way in which the process leads 
to land degradation is empirically evidenced), for LSLAs, DLSFs, and 
value chain coordination separately. We used Mendeley to group and 
annotate retrieved literature (Mendeley database available at request). 
This allowed us to list the mechanisms (hypothesized to be) at play in 
specific contexts, and the agreement and confidence of the current state 
of scientific knowledge concerning these mechanisms. 
Third, to identify ways for VCAs, governmental actors, and other 
LDN brokers to reposition themselves and unlock novel, catalytic 
governance solutions for the attainment of LDN, we similarly performed 
a synthesis exercise on literature retrieved using keywords including 
“private land governance”, “corporate sustainability”, as well as key-
words relating to specific instruments (e.g. “certification”). Adopting 
and combining existing frameworks (Rueda et al., 2017; Schaltegger and 
Burritt, 2018), we question to what extent VCAs can be instrumental for 
LDN, and how LDN brokers can leverage motivators to move VCAs to do 
so. We retrieved and coded evidence on the use and effectiveness of 
instruments described in the abovementioned frameworks from the 
Fig. 1. Agency diagram. Land governance in a given land system is characterized by the extent to which either of three agent groups have agency over the land 
management decision-making process. Smallholder or family farms are a heterogeneous group of land systems, which are dominated by individual land managers but 
may have significant state or value chain agency. Novel land systems such as international LSLAs or domestic larger-scale farms, occupy different positions on the 
diagram. The position of a given land system on the diagram informs the design of interventions to, for example, avoid, reduce or reverse land degradation, and 
indicates the primary partner(s) to address. Positions on the diagram can shift through time. 
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collected literature, using Mendeley to group and annotate documents, 
and assessed the agreement and confidence apparent in the current state 
of the art. 
3. Land governance dynamics 
Two interrelated trends of the 21st century, with relevance to the 
questions surrounding the distribution of agency to decide over land 
management, are of interest. We present literature on value chain co-
ordination, where downstream and upstream actors in agricultural value 
chains use contracts and other mechanisms to influence land manage-
ment of farmers embedded in the value chain. Subsequently we present 
evidence of the shift of land control rights have towards new actors. 
Here, we focus specifically on LSLAs and DLSF, two highly visible trends 
that introduce new actors and break away from the family farming 
structure. 
3.1. Value chain coordination: supermarkets, processors and contract 
farming 
Agricultural value chains can shape land management of farmers 
embedded within them, through predicating inputs and technologies 
that are available to farmers, and standardizing agricultural production 
(Reardon et al., 2009; Zagata and Sutherland, 2015). A major restruc-
turing of the global agrifood industry is taking place, characterized by a 
closer direct involvement of VCAs with the land management of their 
producers, especially in areas near urban centers (Lee et al., 2012; 
Masters et al., 2013). Such value chain coordination can lead to on-the- 
ground land management changes (Rueda and Lambin, 2013). A highly 
visible symptom of this trend is the global rise of supermarkets (Blandon 
et al., 2009; das Nair, 2018; Reardon and Gulati, 2008). Supermarkets 
tend to set specific standards for how crops should be produced and 
impose quality standards on the products themselves (Hazell et al., 
2010). This has the potential to influence land management practices 
(Handschuch et al., 2013; Neven et al., 2009). 
Agricultural processors and large-scale trading firms are also 
increasing their market share and are increasingly engaging in closer 
relationships with supplying farmers. Documented sharp increases are 
reported in Kenya and Zambia, but the full extent of this dynamic is not 
yet fully understood (Sitko et al., 2018). Large-scale trading firms are 
often found to provide agricultural inputs and farmer trainings, thereby 
influencing land management (Sitko et al., 2018). 
The relations between VCAs (supermarkets, trading firms, pro-
cessors) and land managers are increasingly formalized through contract 
farming; which encompass a variety of agreements between farmers and 
buyers (Meemken and Bellemare, 2019). Three types of contract ar-
rangements exist, each with increasing control over the land manage-
ment of the contracted farmers (Prowse, 2012). Through marketing 
contracts, a processor and farmer only specify the quantity, price and 
quality of the product in a contract; resource-providing contracts require 
the processor to provide inputs (seeds, fertilizer, specific hardware), 
often as a loan, thereby exerting some control over the use of these in-
puts; whereas production-management contracts include specific pro-
duction preconditions. A special form of contract farming associated 
with frontier contexts are crop boom-and-bust cycles (Hall, 2011; 
Ornetsmüller et al., 2019), often described in Southeast Asia. These 
cycles see smallholder farmers offered contracts which are to some 
extent predatory in nature, to grow cash crops. After a surge in contract 
adoption, a combination of land degradation and indebtedness creates a 
crop bust (Mahanty and Milne, 2016). 
A global overview of the extent of contract farming is currently 
lacking. Data from the United States, Japan and Europe indicate that 
roughly more than a third of total agricultural production is produced 
under contracts (Otsuka et al., 2016). In the Global South, contract 
farming is important in some countries, (e.g. in Kenya, where 40% of 
farmers produce under contract), while in other countries (Vietnam, 
Ghana, Uganda), scarce evidence suggests that 5% of farmers produce 
under contract (Oya, 2012). 
While empirical evidence is scarce, most literature reports on a rising 
importance of contract farming, both in developed and developing 
countries (Bellemare and Lim, 2018; Otsuka et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
a wealth of case studies (Fig. 2) scrutinizing the micro- and macro- 
economic impacts of contract farms signals their increasing impor-
tance (Smalley, 2013; Wang et al., 2014). These case studies indicate 
that value chain coordination through contract farming is a global 
phenomenon, with case study hotspots in East Africa, Ghana, Southeast 
Asia and the Indian subcontinent. 
3.2. Land control dynamics: International LSLAs and DLSFs 
Concurrent with the trend towards increased value chain actor 
involvement with land management, major land control dynamics are 
taking place. Land control dynamics are changes in the type of actor that 
hold control rights over land (see Table 1), and can therefore decide on 
land use and land management. These land control dynamics introduce 
international actors (e.g. international LSLAs), or a variety of novel 
domestic actors that diverge from typical family farming operations. 
International LSLAs are acquisitions through lease, concession, or 
sale of large tracts of land to international agribusinesses, investors, and 
foreign countries. The most extensive global repository of verified LSLAs 
indicates that, since 2000, over 80 million hectares of land has been 
acquired (Land Matrix, 2019). A timeline of LSLAs (Fig. 3) shows a very 
rapid rise between 2007 and 2014, after which an apparent stagnation is 
observed. This stagnation could represent an actual trend, but is also 
partly explained by time lags between the land acquisition and its 
reporting in the Land Matrix database (Nolte et al., 2016). 
Plantation-style agriculture managed by foreign parties is histori-
cally no novelty, with similar instances having existed in Roman, me-
dieval, colonial and modern times (Alden Wily, 2012). However, in post- 
colonial times, the policy environment changed to foster small-scale, 
family farm production in most areas of the Global South. The sudden 
surge in plantation-style agriculture since 2007 is, therefore, a trend- 
breaking aberration (Byerlee, 2014) 
The LSLA phenomenon is global in reach (Fig. 3), with hotspots in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America 
(Constantin et al., 2017; Rulli et al., 2012). Land is acquired by an 
opaque plethora of international agribusinesses and investment funds 
(Cotula, 2012) mostly for agriculture, although forestry, tourism, in-
dustry, conservation projects and speculation are also notable intentions 
for such investments (Nolte et al., 2016). 
LSLAs have been problematized from different disciplinary per-
spectives (Dell’Angelo et al., 2017). LSLA intentions often fail to come to 
fruition, because frequently, land rights have been transferred to 
nonviable businesses, or to actors interested in the speculative future 
value of the land rights (Deininger et al., 2011). Violations against local 
land rights have been widely reported (Anseeuw et al., 2011). The 
aspiration that LSLAs would develop intensive agriculture on non- 
forested, unused land (Deininger et al., 2011) has largely been 
debunked, as LSLAs target land with these characteristics in only a 
quarter of land deals globally. Oppositely, most deals target either 
populated croplands (displacing local people and creating secondary 
land expansion), or forests (Messerli et al., 2014). 
Domestic larger-scale farms are observed in many countries and 
contexts. In general, these land systems capture a removal from family 
farming towards more capital-intensive, larger-scale farming controlled 
by domestic elites. Family farming is still the dominant mode of agri-
cultural production worldwide when quantified in terms of the number 
of farms (Lowder et al., 2016). However, literature suggests that, across 
the globe, domestic elites are (re-)entering the agricultural sector, 
engaging in farming at larger spatial and capital scales using business 
models that diverge from family farming in numerous ways. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, DLSF is framed under the narrative of “the 
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rise of medium-scale farms” (Jayne et al., 2016). These are entrepre-
neurial farms run by domestic, often urban-based managers operating at 
a larger scale and in a more capital-intensive way than is usual in their 
regional or national context. There are indications that medium-scale 
farms represent a relatively rapid urban takeover of the countryside. 
Empirical evidence on medium-scale farms comes from a number of 
national-scale case studies for Zambia (Sitko and Jayne, 2014), Malawi 
(Anseeuw et al., 2016), Ghana (Chapoto et al., 2013), Kenya (Debonne 
et al., 2020) as well as multi-country studies in West Africa (Hilhorst 
et al., 2011) and Southern Africa (Hall et al., 2017; Jayne et al., 2016). 
The most complete empirical study (Jayne et al., 2016) builds on 
repeated agricultural censuses (Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia) and 
finds that the share of land belonging to the smallholder segment 
(defined as smaller than 5 ha in the study) is generally declining, while 
the medium-scale segment (5 – 100 ha) is growing. Newcomers in this 
segment are often urban-based individuals, and depart from the family 
farm business logic (Anseeuw et al., 2016; Sitko et al., 2018; Sitko and 
Chamberlin, 2015). Geographical analyses find that medium-scale farms 
are located in highly accessible areas close to major towns and cities 
(Sitko and Chamberlin, 2015). However, results of a systematic survey 
of medium- and small-scale farms in the Kenyan Rift Valley finds that the 
qualities attached to this farm size bracket in earlier studies, such as 
their urban origin, entrepreneurship, or tendency to grow non-staple 
crops, are only valid for a subset of medium-scale farms, and are also 
found in a subset of small-scale farms (Debonne et al., 2020). This in-
dicates that, while larger, business-oriented farms may be overtaking the 
African countryside in some places, the evidence is mixed and the extent 
of this dynamic remains difficult to estimate. 
Medium-scale farms can either be characterized as an element of 
structural transformation which is part of other megatrends such as 
urbanization and the rise of supermarkets (Meyfroidt, 2017a; Neven 
et al., 2009), or as an elite capture akin to LSLA (Sitko and Jayne, 2014). 
The fragmented nature of landholdings under customary land tenure 
regimes in Africa has been noted as a major obstacle to the adoption of 
some agricultural technologies (notably mechanization), and the scope 
to consolidate landholdings from within a customary land tenure system 
is often limited (Asiama et al., 2019). Medium-scale farms break with 
customary tenure, and use statutory land tenure arrangements that, 
when backed by state power, can overrule existing customary land rights 
(Chimhowu, 2018). Whether this lateral entry of capital-intensive 
farmers is a necessary source of dynamism or a hostile takeover of 
customary spaces is an open debate (Hall et al., 2017). 
In Latin America, DLSFs are captured under the umbrella of “land 
concentration”, most notably in Argentina and Brazil. While land con-
centration is to a large extent a historical relict, it has intensified since 
2000 (Gómez, 2014). In Argentina and Paraguay, small family farms are 
Fig. 2. Timeline and locations of case studies reporting on contract farming as a proxy for the geographical extent and importance of value chain coordination. 
Hotspots of literature on contract farming are apparent in East Africa, Ghana, Southeast Asia, and the Indian subcontinent. Relative cold sports are Latin America and 
Australia. Developing countries are more often covered by local case studies, while developed countries have more national-scale studies. 
Fig. 3. Timeline and location of international LSLAs as reported in the Land Matrix database. LSLAs for which the location is known with at least regional precision 
are shown as dots, while LSLAs for which only the country is known are shown as blue shades. The timeline shows a stagnation in recent years, which may be partly 
explained by a data gathering time lag but could also indicate actual stagnation. Figures represent concluded international deals since 2000. (For interpretation of the 
references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
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consolidated into larger farms, often for soy production, through leasing 
by capital-endowed individuals. These tenants lease and pool numerous 
adjacent farms, often without personally residing on-site (Elgert, 2016; 
Urcola et al., 2015). In Brazil, land concentration is partly attributed to 
elite capture of land for speculative and productive purposes, enabled by 
unclear land tenure regulations (Reydon et al., 2015; Sparovek et al., 
2019). Rapid concentration has also been noted in Uruguay, where land 
is transferring from individuals to domestic corporations (Piñeiro, 
2012). To varying extents, such processes are taking place across the 
continent (for an overview, see Borras et al., 2012). 
Likewise, a fast-paced increment of farm scale enlargement is 
occurring in Europe. The number of farms in the European Union has 
decreased by 25% between 2005 and 2016. Most of the disappearing 
farms are small (<5 ha), and are being consolidated into larger farms; 
the only growing farm size segment is the one of 100 ha and above 
(EUROSTAT, 2018). The specific dynamics of farm consolidation in 
Europe are highly context-specific, and driving factors include demog-
raphy, economic liberalization and competitiveness, and policy biases 
(Bartolini and Viaggi, 2013; van Vliet et al., 2015). A significant fraction 
of the resulting large farms (40% of 304 000 farms with an output of 
over 250 000 euro per year) are owned by various types of agribusiness 
holdings (EUROSTAT, 2018), signaling that European land is increas-
ingly being managed and owned by business interests instead of family 
farmers. 
3.3. Land governance agency shift 
Value chain coordination and land control dynamics are shifting 
agency in land governance, causing a redistribution of agency over land 
management decisions (Fig. 4). In other words, the answer to “who 
decides?” on land management is changing. As VCAs set production 
standards and provide access to agricultural inputs and technologies, 
they co-determine land management practices at global scales. This 
significant agency is, for example, leveraged to enforce health and safety 
standards across entire value chains, including soil and water manage-
ment (Subervie and Vagneron, 2013). 
Land control dynamics further contribute to these agency shifts. This 
occurs directly, as land control rights are being transferred away from 
state actors (e.g. when LSLAs target protected areas or other state land) 
and from individual land managers. Land becomes controlled by actors 
that are more closely associated with VCAs: they are wholly reliant on 
VCAs through contracts or, in the case of many LSLAs, are owned by 
agribusinesses. 
Indirectly, land control dynamics are additionally found to override 
state regulations, either by clientelism or by unpenalized rule breaking 
(Cotula et al., 2011; Messerli, 2015; The World Bank, 2014), thereby 
significantly reducing state agency. The various modes of DLSFs are 
similarly associated with a redistribution of agency away from state 
actors. For example, African medium-scale farms managers have been 
found to dominate agricultural policy-making processes by occupying 
powerful positions in farmer organizations (Jayne et al., 2016). 
4. Agency shifts as enablers of land degradation 
A document analysis on literature associating LSLAs, DLSFs, and/or 
value chain coordination with processes of land degradation reveals that 
agency shifts are associated with two key processes of land degradation: 
conversion of natural areas (e.g. deforestation), and introduction and 
Fig. 4. Agency shifts as a consequence of value chain coordination and land control dynamics.  
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incentivization of unsustainable land management. The degree to which 
it can be claimed various forms of agency shifts are a necessary or suf-
ficient cause of land degradation, and the certainty surrounding such 
claims, varies per land degradation process and per land governance 
dynamic. In most cases, the agency shift is at least found to be generating 
the possibility of intensified land degradation, e.g. by providing tech-
nology or institutional capacity that was not present before. Therefore, 
while in some cases, stronger causal language may be appropriate, we 
opt to frame agency shifts more carefully as enablers of land degrada-
tion, implying that they widen the range of land management options 
and thereby include damaging options. We discuss the specific causal 
mechanisms described in literature below. 
4.1. Conversion of natural areas: Ecological and institutional unlocking 
The scope for expansion of global cultivated areas at the cost of 
natural areas is dependent on ecological limitations and institutional 
rulesets (Eitelberg et al., 2015). Ecological limitations and institutional 
rulesets limit where agriculture is feasible and allowed, thereby safe-
guarding areas that are ecologically too unsuitable for agriculture and/ 
or are adequately protected. We indicate below how VCAs have 
ecologically and institutionally unlocked some of these safe havens. 
First, ecological limitations can to some extent be overcome by 
technology-intensive farming systems using, for example, irrigation 
technology or synthetic fertilizers (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 2001; Hall 
et al., 2017). This “ecological unlocking” is described in a number of 
case studies. For example, the conversion of an extensively used dryland 
area to a biofuel LSLA in Mozambique was made possible by developing 
irrigation infrastructure at a scale unattainable by local smallholders 
(Borras et al., 2011). For LSLAs, ecological unlocking has not been an 
accidental by-product, but rather an explicit element of its supporting 
narrative to develop “underused”, “marginal” lands in “land-abundant 
areas” (Deininger and Byerlee, 2012). 
Ecological unlocking is also a central tenet of many contract farming 
schemes where downstream VCAs provide inputs or hardware to farmers 
to enable them to adopt crops. A prime example is the rapid spread of 
rubber in Southeast Asia, which is replacing shifting cultivation land-
scapes and forests (Ahrends et al., 2015). Similarly, boom and bust dy-
namics build on dispersion of technologies such as hybrid maize and 
synthetic fertilizers through middle men, thus allowing crops to be 
grown outside of their ecologically suitable range, albeit only for a 
limited time and at the cost of severe land degradation (Ornetsmüller 
et al., 2019). 
Second, institutional unlocking denotes the diminishing power of 
regulation, land use planning, or protected areas, in limiting where 
agriculture can expand into. This further enables conversions of natural 
areas, again especially in the case of LSLAs. The apparent disregard of 
LSLAs to respect the integrity of protected areas or stay clear of valuable 
ecosystems (Koh and Wilcove, 2008; Messerli, 2015) indicates that 
institutional barriers against degradation have become largely irrele-
vant in an LSLA context. 
Many LSLAs are expansionist in nature and thereby often claim new 
areas beyond the extent of current agricultural areas at the expense of 
nature. Geographic analysis has shown that, globally, LSLAs often target 
forested areas (e.g. in Brazil, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, Congo), and 
acquired areas and their surroundings are found to be deforested at 
faster rates than comparable non-acquired areas (Davis et al., 2015; 
Eakin et al., 2014; Magliocca et al., 2019). Besides forests, other 
important habitats such as savannas are lost to LSLAs, thereby under-
mining efforts to safeguard biodiversity (Debonne et al., 2019). 
In contrast to the expansionist nature of LSLAs, preliminary spatial 
analyses of DLSFs in Africa indicates that these farms predominantly 
develop in areas with high agricultural potential (Sitko and Chamberlin, 
2015), and may, therefore, be less likely to cause natural ecosystem 
losses (as target areas are usually already cultivated). For contract 
farming, natural area loss is found when the short-term lucrativeness 
and/or indebtedness drives farmers to expand their landholdings, as has 
been observed in the Southeast Asian rubber sector (Ahrends et al., 
2015), cattle rearing in the Brazilian Amazon (Pereira et al., 2016), or 
the many oil palm outgrower schemes in the global tropics (e.g. in 
Indonesia: Euler et al. (2015) and Peru: Bennett et al. (2018)). 
4.2. Introduction and incentivization of unsustainable land management 
Agency shifts in land governance may also enable land degradation 
in cases where the affected areas were already under agricultural use, if 
the agency shift incentivizes or introduces unsustainable land manage-
ment practices. As VCAs increase their agency over land management 
decisions and land control dynamics introduce new actors, three causal 
links explain an often-observed shift to more unsustainable land man-
agement practices. 
First, capital and technology can significantly intensify land man-
agement. Value chain coordination delivers capital and technology, 
notably through input-providing contract farming. Moreover, compared 
to smallholder farms, LSLAs and DLSFs are typically more capital- 
intensive. Conventional agricultural intensification, while able to in-
crease crop yields in the short term, can come at the expense of other 
ecosystem functions and can be unsustainable in the longer term 
(Deguines et al., 2014). For example, crop boom and bust cycles are 
instigated by VCAs introducing seeds and inputs for intensive agricul-
ture in extensively used landscapes, leaving depleted and eroded soils 
after the bust phase (Ornetsmüller et al., 2019). Overuse of inputs and a 
switch from diverse cropping systems to monocultures has also been 
described for LSLAs (e.g. Friis, 2015; Mann and Bonanomi, 2017). A 
World Bank study found that 32 out of 33 surveyed LSLAs engaged in 
patently deleterious land management, including unsustainable mono- 
cropping, excessive use of pesticides, and water resource depletion 
and pollution (The World Bank, 2014). Similarly, a multi-country West- 
African study found anecdotal evidence of more soil erosion occurring in 
DLSFs relative to smallholder farmers (Hilhorst et al., 2011). 
Second, land control dynamics have introduced actors that often act 
as absentee, distant land owners/managers, creating a situation where 
land management decisions are made by people who are physically 
disconnected from the land they manage. Similarly, VCAs up- or 
downstream of the farm influence land management of farms without 
residing on, or near to, these farms. It can be hypothesized that absentee 
land owners/managers are less inclined to value sustainability, as they 
are protected from immediate negative effects of unsustainable prac-
tices. Corroborating evidence for this hypothesis is found in several 
cases; in the United States, absentee land owners have been found to be 
less likely to manage against soil erosion or participate in soil conser-
vation programs (Petrzelka and Armstrong, 2015; Stroman and Kreuter, 
2015); in a case study from the Philippines, Ravnborg (2003) found that 
absentee land managers were the only land manager group contesting 
restrictions on adverse agricultural practices, pushing for more lenience 
in the use of chemical inputs and opposing to land restoration projects. 
Contrastingly, in Australia, absentee land owners using their land mostly 
for recreational purposes have been found to engage in conservation 
efforts (Kam et al., 2019). Currently, the evidence concerning this hy-
pothesis is still too anecdotal to warrant strong claims. 
Third, the agency shift may promote a short-term economic interest 
in land, undermining longer-term sustenance of productive capacity. 
Growing crops in suboptimal environments can cause severe or even 
irreparable land degradation, yet still make business sense to actors who 
do not rely on that specific land for their long-term sustenance and 
livelihood. This is a defining characteristic of crop booms (Hall, 2011; 
Mahanty and Milne, 2016). Furthermore, many studies have noted the 
surprisingly large amount of failed LSLAs, where production stops 
within a few years after startup (Nolte et al., 2016), often due to 
ecological unsustainability and soil depletion (Messerli, 2015; 
Schönweger and Messerli, 2015). DLSFs are estimated to be more 
embedded within their local communities and to create long-term 
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economic linkages, but empirical evidence is scarce (Hilhorst et al., 
2011; Meyfroidt, 2017). 
5. Reponses to the agency shift 
Responses and measures to attain the LDN target may be more 
effective if they are tailored to the new global land governance contexts. 
Hereafter we outline how value chain coordination and land control 
dynamics can be leveraged to implement LDN measures at scale. First, 
we discuss the instruments that VCAs have at their disposal to avoid, 
reduce, and reverse land degradation. Second, we identify motivators 
for the adoption of these instruments, and how state actors and other 
LDN brokers can interact with these motivators. 
5.1. Instruments of VCAs 
VCAs may use a mix of metaphorical carrots, sticks, and sermons to, 
respectively, promote LDN, penalize unsustainable land management, 
and foster awareness, knowledge, and partnership towards LDN in their 
value chain (Fig. 5). Following Rueda et al. (2017), we organize the 
possible value chain instruments based on stringency. We further assess 
to what extent, and how, instruments can be used in either step of the 
LDN response hierarchy. Instruments aiming to avoid land degradation 
must be able to purge the value chain from products associated with 
ongoing processes of land degradation. Reduction of land degradation in 
value chains can be achieved by ensuring that suppliers transition to 
SLM and abandon degrading land management practices. Land degra-
dation reversal requires that the productive potential and ecological 
functioning of degraded landscapes is (partially) restored. 
Trainings are often used by agribusinesses, in a fashion similar to 
governmental or NGO-led agricultural extension (Anderson, 2008). 
While the overall focus of such trainings is usually farm yield maximi-
zation, sustainability can be part of the curriculum too. For example, 
Callebaut, a major chocolate processing company, assists its suppliers to 
enhance the carbon sequestration potential of cocoa farms, among 
others by promoting tree-shaded cocoa (Barry Callebaut, 2018; Cocoa 
Horizons, 2018). Such interventions constitute an effort to not only 
avoid and reduce degradation, but also to reverse it. 
Codes of conduct are intentions and targets set and evaluated by 
companies. They are low-stringency interventions because, while their 
goal is a modicum of self-regulation, non-adherence is not penalized - 
and in many cases not made public. Their effectiveness is, therefore, 
entirely dependent on the internal discipline of the company and the 
extent to which the code of conduct is able to affect the core business 
model (Mårtensson and Westerberg, 2016). In most cases, a supplier’s 
non-compliance will not constitute grounds for exclusion from the 
supply chain (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2014). Unilever provides 
an example of a wide-ranging environmental code of conduct. Their 
Sustainable Agriculture Programme defines 11 standards, among which 
are soil health, soil loss, nutrients, pest management, and biodiversity. 
Supplying farmers and companies are encouraged to comply with these 
standards, and develop strategies to book incremental progress. Despite 
the non-compulsory nature of the standards, the code of conduct pro-
vides a common definition of sustainability and allows Unilever to track 
its progress (Unilever, 2019). 
Roundtables are sector-wide platforms where multiple stakeholders 
(farmers, processors, retailers, NGOs) meet to share best practices and 
strive towards sector-wide sustainability (Schouten and Glasbergen, 
2011). Typically, roundtables produce a shared code of conduct to 
which participating companies commit to comply. Examples include the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, the Roundtable on Sustainable 
Biofuels, and the Roundtable on Sustainable Soy. Their scope is similar 
to the codes of conduct for individual companies, although the focus of 
roundtables has typically been on halting rampant deforestation rather 
than the promotion of SLM practices. Roundtables can issue certificates 
for compliant producers, thereby setting stricter requirements than are 
provided in the national laws of producers (Garrett et al., 2016). 
Eco-certification is a communication tool developed to allow pro-
ducers to ascertain the sustainability of their products to obtain a pre-
mium price from consumers with a sustainability preference (Defries 
et al., 2017). The certification is performed by an external auditor based 
on a set of criteria and allows for a label to be displayed on certified 
products. For example, the Rainforest Alliance currently certifies 1.3 
million farmers operating on 3.5 million hectares and auditing based on 
23 mandatory and 77 flexible criteria. Criteria include nature conser-
vation and proper agricultural input use (Rainforest Alliance, 2018). 
Whether eco-certification (or the certification issued by roundtables) is 
able to spread SLM rather than merely reward current SLM practitioners 
remains unclear (Blackman and Rivera, 2011). 
Contract conditions are clauses attached to contract farming schemes. 
Where contract farming takes the form of a production-management 
contract, downstream VCAs can demand crops to be produced under a 
specific land management (Abebe et al., 2013; Bellemare and Lim, 
2018). These conditions are often related to food safety, imposing, for 
example, specific food storage conditions. However, sustainability can 
be part of these conditions as well. For example, in Madagascar, Minten 
et al. (2009) reported that farmers producing vegetables under contract 
for European markets face strict requirements, and as a consequence 
show more sustainable management of resources. Similarly, Van Hoi 
et al. (2010) describe input limitations imposed on Vietnamese farmers 
that produce vegetables for export. 
Retailer standards are developed to enable retailers to perform due 
Fig. 5. Instruments available to VCAs to promote SLM and self-regulate sustainability take the form of carrots (rewarding positive action), sticks (penalizing negative 
action) or sermons (sharing information and best practices). Interventions are ordered from least to most stringent (left to right). There are numerous interventions 
that can be instrumental in avoiding or reducing the land degradation associated with a value chain. The scope for reversal of land degradation remains limited. 
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diligence, and share similarities with eco-certification schemes. For 
example, GlobalGAP (Global Partnership for Good Agricultural Prac-
tices) is used by over 40 large retailers in 15 countries (mainly in 
Western Europe). These retailers thereby ensure that products in their 
shelves meet all GlobalGAP criteria. The certification is very broad, 
incorporating elements of hygiene, traceability, on-farm labor, and food 
safety. While sustainability and environmental criteria are present, these 
are typically “recommended” rather than imposed. For example, Glob-
alGAP asks that consideration be given to enhancing the environment 
and to minimize environmental impact (GlobalGAP, 2017). For farmers 
wishing to export to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands or Germany, 
being certified by GlobalGAP is a de facto requirement as virtually all 
retailers in these countries require it (Colen et al., 2012). In Vietnam, 
rice farmers certified by GlobalGAP and VietGAP (the Vietnamese cer-
tification institution) are found to use significantly less inputs (fertilizers 
and pesticides) compared to non-certified farmers (Stuart et al., 2018). 
Bans and moratoria are high-stringency tools that aim to completely 
remove producers that practice degrading land management from the 
value chain. The Amazon Soy Moratorium, for example, precludes 
farmers operating within recently deforested areas of the Amazon 
rainforest to sell to participating processors. Because participants 
include major processors like Cargill and Bunge, a significant part of the 
soybean sector could be cornered. If complemented by remote sensing- 
based monitoring, deforestation can be attributed to individual pro-
ducers, thus creating a major disincentive to further degradation (Nep-
stad et al., 2014). However, critics argue that this moratorium ignores 
the stepwise nature of land use changes (e.g. where forest is first con-
verted to pastures, and only later these pastures are converted to soy 
plantations; Arima et al. (2011). Furthermore, as soy expansion is 
effectively curtailed in the regulated area, it moves towards unregulated 
areas instead (Gibbs et al., 2015). 
Whether or not VCAs can be effective environmental stewards is 
heavily debated. In the field of forest conservation, value chain initia-
tives have been found to exert relatively minor and often unverifiable 
impacts, and where local effectiveness is evident, it is often offset by 
leakage of deforestation to other areas (Blackman and Rivera, 2011; 
Gibbs et al., 2015; Lambin et al., 2018). However, as an increasing 
amount of brands and companies are adopting standards, incremental 
positive changes are occurring (Defries et al., 2017). Whether or not 
current approaches are effective, the increasingly consolidated nature of 
many food supply chains, where a handful of companies control the 
markets for e.g. coffee, banana, palm oil or cocoa, creates an imperative 
to interact with VCAs to develop more effective measures (Folke et al., 
2019). 
5.2. Motivators for value chain action towards LDN and options for 
policy makers 
Following the previous section, we now question why VCAs would 
adopt instruments in line with the LDN target. Instruments are adopted 
when there is a business case to do so, and these can range from reac-
tionary appeasement of environmental criticism to reputational business 
cases or the recognition of LDN as an inherent quality of responsible 
agribusiness (Schaltegger and Burritt, 2018). We identify four motiva-
tors that interfere with such business cases and explore the role of 
policy-making to stimulate, enable, or push VCAs (Table 2). 
First, to motivate VCAs concerned with building or maintaining a 
brand reputation, the link between products and their associated land 
degradation should be made transparent. Innovative tools, such as the 
TRASE database (www.trase.earth) are allowing researchers to scruti-
nize commitments (e.g. zu Ermgassen, 2020). However, agricultural 
value chains remain opaque (Keene et al., 2015; McSweeney and 
Coomes, 2020), and attributing land degradation to specific actors or 
products continues to be challenging (Paitan and Verburg, 2019). 
Second, land degradation often leads to reduced yields. Therefore, 
SLM can — in many cases— maintain or increase yields, although effects 
may not be immediate (Schmidt and Tadesse, 2019). However, for some 
forms of SLM and in certain contexts, yields will not increase but will 
rather be part of a trade-off against other co-benefits (Seufert and 
Ramankutty, 2017). When SLM increases yield or reduces risks, it is 
well-aligned with business interests. Governments can enable this 
motivator by supporting innovation, e.g. by providing transitional 
funding, microfinance, or linkups with research institutes. For example, 
the LDN Fund is a global initiative to provide structural funding to 
businesses aiming to contribute to LDN (Global Mechanism, 2019b; 
Quatrini and Crossman, 2018). However, as described above, institu-
tional and ecological unlocking processes imply that, from the 
perspective of a VCA, degraded land can easily be replaced by tapping 
into frontier land. A disregard for the long-term productive capacity in a 
context of narratives of available land (Deininger et al., 2011) may 
therefore pose a challenge to triggering this motivator. Secure land 
tenure for smallholders and stringent land zoning policies can dissuade 
unmitigated agricultural expansion and encourage VCAs to maintain or 
enhance the soil quality of current agricultural land. 
A third motivator is the ability for sustainability leaders to tap into 
niche markets, using certificates and labels to attest to sustainable 
practices. The potency of this motivator grows when more consumers 
are willing to pay higher premiums. Policy makers can further main-
stream and regulate certificates and labels, create awareness among 
consumers, and provide financial assistance to support sustainable 
transitions and certification. However, the amount of consumers willing 
to pay for less degrading products is limited (Wei et al., 2018). Certifi-
cation may help to support an ecological vanguard, but niche markets 
are easily saturated and therefore relying on consumer preferences is 
unlikely to be sufficient (Rueda et al., 2017). 
Fourth, VCAs may be pushed towards sustainability by legal re-
quirements, taxes, or subsidies. These motivators are especially required 
to move environmental laggards (i.e. those who fail to find a business 
Table 2 
Motivators for value chain action towards LDN, and their respective enablers, triggers, and challenges.  
Motivator Enablement / trigger Challenges 
Reputational damage  - Scrutiny, naming and shaming  
- Value chain transparency (e.g. TRASE)  
- Lack of traceability and value chain opaqueness 
Land degradation reduces yields, SLM provides 
long-term yield stability and/or increases 
yields  
- Support SLM innovation (transitional funding, 
microfinance)  
- Limit agricultural expansion by securing land 
rights and enforcing deliberate land use plans  
- Provide transitional funding / microfinance  
- Ecological and institutional unlocking makes new, non-degraded land 
available, removing the incentive to invest in maintenance of productive 
capacity  
- Trade-offs between SLM and short-term yields for many crops 
Access to sustainable niche markets  - Support and regulate certification schemes  
- Increase consumer awareness  
- Saturation of niche markets limits potential 
Legal requirements, taxes and subsidies  - Set standards, adopt existing certification as 
minimum requirement  
- Make specific, highly degrading practices 
illegal (e.g. pesticide bans)  
- Financial incentives  
- Lack of traceability and value chain opaqueness  
- VCAs seeking lowest governance denominator  
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case for action against land degradation). Governments can for example 
turn existing voluntary certification into a minimum production pre-
requisite, thus requiring due diligence from, for example, supermarkets 
(Colen et al., 2012). More classical approaches include using land use 
planning to require or restrict specific land management in specific 
places (Metternicht, 2018), or the banning or taxing of specific practices 
(e.g. pesticide bans; Maggi et al., 2019). However, beyond issues of 
attributing land degradation to products or companies, a major chal-
lenge lies in the globalized nature of the agrifood industry and the 
limitations of national governments in a context of international trade 
agreements (Eyhorn et al., 2019). Transnational companies may flee 
countries with strong environmental governance (Le Polain De Waroux 
et al., 2016). Supranational organizations and conventions, such as the 
UNCCD, may therefore have a role in facilitating a harmonized and 
sufficiently ambitious policy framework, as is also requested by the 
business community (WBCSD, 2019). 
5.3. Towards a new strategy for LDN 
Governments and other LDN brokers have several ways to reposition 
themselves given the agency shifts and the implications thereof, outlined 
above. This repositioning can take three forms, which we discuss below. 
First, a re-appreciation of territorial land governance implies that 
state actors reclaim some agency at the expense of VCAs. In this, they 
acknowledge that the agency shift, if left unchecked, enables new forms 
of intensified land degradation. State actors may reclaim agency, e.g. 
through enforcement of environmental regulations. While market-based 
policies and instruments may have a potential to regulate value chains 
(Baumber et al., 2019), issues arising from land control dynamics 
(agricultural expansion and unsustainable land management) remain 
unresolved. Therefore, enforcement of environmental regulations be-
comes necessary to reestablish the agency of state actors where it has 
shifted excessively towards VCAs. Interestingly, such regulations are 
requested by VCAs (WBCSD, 2019). For example, a survey among LSLAs 
(The World Bank, 2014) found that most LSLA managers welcome 
stricter environmental impact assessments. Insofar as these are equally 
applied to all competitors, they would enable the adoption of required 
SLM measures. 
Second, a hybridization of land governance recognizes that sponta-
neous private environmental governance, while promising, is not suffi-
cient (Dauvergne and Lister, 2012; Lambin et al., 2014). This is 
especially so for LDN, where the scope of VCAs to turn degradation 
reversal into a business case is limited. Therefore, there are calls for 
governments to collaborate with private actors in hybrid land gover-
nance arrangements, where they complement each other’s possibilities 
and constraints (Rueda et al., 2017). Sikor et al. (2013) define such 
governance applied to value chains as flow-centered governance, which 
stands in contrast with traditional territory-centered governance. Flow- 
centered governance has significant benefits in terms of scalability. 
Baumber et al. (2019) assess to what extent existing market-based in-
struments, such as the offsetting of damaging practices, mandates and 
obligations, grants, subsidies, or tax instruments, could be applicable 
and effective for LDN. These instruments are currently being applied in 
the realm of carbon emissions, biodiversity and other ecosystem ser-
vices, and the authors conclude that LDN could be integrated in such 
existing instruments, although this hasn’t been done yet. 
Third, the coordination of the LDN target is primarily in the hands of 
the UNCCD, and their role may increase in importance because of the 
agency shift. The current policy dialogue to attain LDN is mostly a 
dialogue between state actors and the parties of the convention. As an 
example, the UNFCCC has since 2011 organized the Momentum for 
Change initiative, which takes the shape of a platform where businesses 
can share best practices in the fight against climate change. As a result, 
numerous partnerships between businesses have arisen (Hickmann 
et al., 2019). The UNCCD is finding a similar strategy, engaging with 
business platforms in the Conference of the Parties (Decision 6 COP.14), 
organizing seed funding for private LDN action through the LDN Fund 
(Global Mechanism, 2019b), and engaging with existing business plat-
forms (WBCSD, 2019). Furthermore, the profile of LDN as an urgent and 
worthwhile international target with multiple co-benefits (Allen et al., 
2020) can be raised among business communities. Moving further on 
this pathway, LDN could become part of existing or new sustainability 
standards, retailer standards, certification boards, and roundtables. 
6. Conclusion 
Our findings are based on a broad literature review in which the 
multiple dynamics in agricultural land governance are confronted with 
the current approach towards LDN. LDN does not only pertain to agri-
cultural land, and further inquiries into similar dynamics in, for 
example, the forestry or mining sectors, could complement our findings. 
Furthermore, we note that certain aspects of the interface between land 
governance agency shifts and environmental management remain 
understudied. For example, while gender dimensions of (the efforts 
against) land degradation are found to be a key aspect of LDN (Collantes 
et al., 2018), there are currently no studies into gender dimensions of 
LDN in relation to the land governance dynamics described here. Lastly, 
while this paper includes perspectives from research institutes, inter-
national organizations, and other grey literature, it can only serve as a 
proxy of the agency shifts described here. Continued efforts to map and 
track global agricultural dynamics could complement and improve our 
approximations, while a dialogue with stakeholders may bring addi-
tional nuance to the perspectives in this paper. With these limitations in 
mind, our literature review has indicated that:  
1) Land governance is undergoing drastic changes, mostly manifested 
in a considerable agency shift towards VCAs at the expense of state 
actors and land managers. 
2) This agency shift can lead to conversion of natural land to agricul-
tural land and incentivize unsustainable agricultural intensification, 
thereby undermining progress towards LDN.  
3) Newly empowered VCAs have instruments and business cases for 
actions aligned with the LDN target. 
The UNCCD, state actors, and other LDN brokers can reposition 
themselves to respond to this changing context in three ways: regaining 
control to curtail VCAs driving land degradation, hybridizing land 
governance to leverage the many tools and business cases VCAs have to 
be instrumental towards LDN, and coordinating an intensified dialogue 
between VCAs and LDN brokers to mainstream LDN in agribusiness 
value chains. 
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